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Gertrude Stein questions the event as an external and contingent accident, to be at 
least subsumed within the continuum of thinking —the untimely flux of interior 
meditation and creation. Throughout her prolific production, one of Stein’s major 
attempts was to do away with the event in literature, to dispense with it, to play 
against it.  Stein pointedly selected as her topic the contingency of life within 
historical time, in her several autobiographical texts from The Autobiography of 
Alice B. Toklas (1932) to Wars I Have Seen (1944). Wars I Have Seen proves to be a 
singular work which helps us realise the process through which Stein resists 
historical contingency. As this essay argues, Wars I Have Seen gives us a remarkable 
vision of Stein trying to resist the pressure of History, and a vision of literature trying 
to hold at bay the contingency of events. 
 
 
During her tour of America in 1934-1935, Stein gave four lectures at the University 
of Chicago, which came to be published under the common title Narration. She 
never ascribed specific titles to any of them, but Alice Toklas mentioned that Stein 
had provisional titles in mind, of which, most interestingly, the one for the third 
lecture was “Is History Narrative,” and for the fourth one “Is History Literature.” 
Regarding narrative, Stein writes: “Narrative is what anybody has to say in any way 
about anything that can happen has happened will happen in any way.” (Narration 
31) In this definition, she carelessly or carefully mixes past and future events, as 
well as facts with possibility. There seem to concur here a touch of Nietzsche’s 
criticism of historical time and Benjamin’s questioning of the very possibility for a 
continuous narrative of history. In Stein, this questioning takes the form of a 
criticism of the event as an external and contingent accident, to be at least 
subsumed within the continuum of thinking —the untimely flux of interior 
meditation and creation. 
Throughout her prolific production, one of Stein’s major attempts was to do 
away with the event in literature, to dispense with it, to play against it. In her essay 
“What are Master-pieces and Why Are There So Few of Them” (1935), she writes: 
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“[…] what is happening is not really interesting, one knows it by radios cinemas 
newspapers biographies autobiographies until what is happening is not really 
interesting” (Writings 357). Thus events can prove eventually uninteresting, and all 
the more so since they are recorded in a temporality which can never coincide with 
the present time of their occurrence. We find a more general and still more Steinian 
phrasing of the same idea in The Geographical History of America: “The 
newspapers tell about events but what have events to do with anything nothing 
nothing I tell you nothing events have nothing to do with anything nothing […]” 
(95). In this book, Stein differentiates human nature from the human mind, events 
having to do with human nature, with what happens, the outside, while creation, 
invention and literature pertain to the human mind. As to the genius, such as 
defined by Stein for herself —as well as for Picasso and a very few others—, he or 
she is the one who can still be listening to the murmur of events outside while being 
predominantly occupied with the telling inside. Thinking about the event led Stein 
to question the relation between history and literature: 
 
You can see it is difficult very difficult that history can ever come to be literature. But 
it would be so very interesting if it could be so very interesting. […] it is a more 
difficult thing to write history to make it anything than to make anything that is 
anything be anything because in history you have everything […].” (Narration 54)  
 
By “everything” Stein means everything that happens and which comes to us 
through multiple intermediate forms, hence a kind of saturation that cannot be 
translated into the creative work as “anything.” Further on in the same fourth 
lecture in Narration, she establishes a parallel between history and what she calls 
“detective stories,” an analogy which may somehow enlighten us on her conception 
of the event. Stein always felt a certain fascination for detective stories, and she 
herself wrote both crime fiction and essays on it. Her persistent interest has to do 
first with the possibility of a radical narrative disruption caused by the crime itself, 
as it brings historical time to a violent stop and suspension, to the benefit of a time 
of thinking (the investigation).1 Most important to Stein, the crime occurs before 
the narration itself begins. She makes her point in “What are Master-pieces”:   
 
[…] the only really modern novel form that has come into existence gets rid of human 
nature by having the man dead to begin with the hero is dead to begin with and so 
you have so to speak got rid of the event before the book begins. […] In real life 
people are interested in the crime more than they are in detection […] but in the story 
it is the detection that holds the interest […] it is another function that has very little 
to do with human nature that makes the detection interesting. And so always it is true 
that the master-piece has nothing to do with human nature or with identity, it has to 
do with the human mind and the entity that is with a thing in itself and not in 
relation. (358) 
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For Stein, death at the beginning altogether eliminates the event, historical time, 
and human nature (including identity), to be replaced by detection, untimely 
speculation and the human mind (entity). We realise how that type of crime story 
structure may have presented itself as a sort of ready-made pattern for her own 
vision of a partition between human nature and the human mind, external event 
and the inner flow of thought. She merely had to move from the sequential order of 
event and speculation in the crime story to her own spatial representation of the 
creative gesture. This shift to her own writing, however, entails an inevitable return 
of life, that is of relation, and of external necessity—what she calls “the business of 
living,” which is quite adverse to her idea of what a master-piece should be: 
 
[master-pieces] exist because they came to be as something that is an end in itself 
and in that respect it is opposed to the business of living which is relation and 
necessity. That is what a master-piece is not although it may easily be what a master-
piece talks about.” (“What are Masterpieces” 359) 
 
So for Stein, life comes back only as a possible topic which should never 
contaminate form. However, she repeatedly courted danger when pointedly 
selecting as her topic the contingency of life within historical time, as she did in her 
several autobiographical texts, from The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1932) 
to Wars I Have Seen (1944). The latter work might prove particularly interesting in 
this respect, since it records how the contingency of history came back most 
dangerously in Stein’s life, to the point of even partly reinvesting the very form of 
the text. Wars I Have Seen is a late work, and her last autobiographical text. She 
started writing it in 1942 in their new country house in Culoz where she resided 
with Toklas until the end of the war; and she completed it at the moment when the 
American GIs arrived in the area in 1944. One of the most easy reads of Stein, it is 
also the only autobiographical work in which she adopts at times a kind of diary 
form, often mentioning the very date of her writing. In these diaristic passages, the 
reader gets the impression of a journalistic-like time relation to current events and 
news.  
The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, published in 1933, deals with the three 
previous decades of her life, while Everybody’s Autobiography, published in 1937, 
covers the few years before the war. Even the short text Paris, France, published in 
1940, was subtitled “Personal Recollections,” suggesting at least a minimal distance 
from recent events, through the mention of memory. But we find no such distance 
in Wars I Have Seen, which might seem then to be just the reverse of Stein’s 
definition of a master-piece. In fact, the 258-pages long text gives us a remarkable 
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vision of Stein trying to resist the pressure of History, and a vision of literature 
trying to hold at bay the contingency of events. 
The book falls into three significant moments. Firstly, the reality of the Second 
World War tends to be subsumed into the recurrence of wars and the generality of 
war. This is achieved through an alternation of private memories from childhood 
(where war can even be privatised to become an adolescent’s inside warfare), of 
meditations on death or fear, and of digressions about such notions as evolution or 
coincidence. Stein repeatedly fights off the anxiety of contingency through 
generality and relativism: “It is funny about wars, they ought to be different but 
they are not” (11). The very idea of repetition allows her to regain both an untimely 
perspective and the signature of her own literary voice, when she, for instance, 
writes: “It is extraordinary how having done a thing once you have to do it again, 
there is the pleasure of coincidence and there is the pleasure of repetition, and so 
there is the second world war” (72). Stein here sets up repetition as a principle of 
necessity thanks to which World War II takes the form of an inevitable avatar —
inevitable but also pleasurable, as implied by the anaphoric structure “there is the 
pleasure of coincidence…there is the pleasure of repetition…there is the second 
world war,” where pleasure is both missing and present in the last clause. The 
anaphora also includes that particular war in a series of general facts, making of it 
the abstract consequence of temporal and narrative systems. Indeed, bearing in 
mind how strategies of coincidence, and, even more, of repetition always 
characterised her writing, we may be under the impression that World War II in 
the passage quoted above comes to be the very product of the Steinese idiom; 
moreover, while the degree of irony usually proves so delicate to assess in her 
works, there clearly seems to be very little or none here. Still, in this first part of 
Wars I Have Seen, Stein often adopts the stance of an exterior spectator when, for 
instance, she writes “I do not like to fish in troubled waters but I do like to see the 
troubled water, the fish and the fishermen” (70). At such a relatively early moment 
in the war, she frankly disengages herself from historical contingencies, to enjoy 
the spectacle of confusion this war can offer, as being full of pleasurable 
complications: “[…] oh it is all so complicated and every day and in every way I like 
the complications being so complicated” (70). There is no denying that any 
contemporary reader will experience an uneasy feeling when reading about such 
delight which implies an abstraction from the moral dimension and a shift towards 
a formal realm, as Stein is enjoying the kaleidoscope of French stances and 
comments in a war that is so unlike the clear-cut oppositional map of World War I.2 
We may wonder, however, to what extent she might be trying hard not to place 
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herself among the possible “fish” in that confusing war, and wishing to palliate 
anguish behind ideas of form. Though judging solely from the grammar of the text, 
signs and symptoms of fear eventually come later. In this first part of the memoir, 
she also keeps resorting to literary analogies that come to frame the historical 
event. She can thus often de-realise the war as historical fact, and the event of 
death in it as well, through references to Shakespeare or to Stephen Crane’s The 
Red Badge of Courage, for instance, or through the detective stories she says she 
loves to read more than ever. Crime stories indeed appear then as a way to displace 
or fictionalise contingency:  
 
Oh dear me, when this you see, but after all, when this you see, and after all you 
would imagine that with all that I would not any longer want to read mystery stories 
and spy stories and all that but not at all I want to read them more than ever, to 
change one reality for another, one unreality for another […].” (47)  
 
One can feel in these lines her fighting off the constraint of history and the pressure 
of contingency through fiction. The possible twinge of conscience gets to be 
palliated anyway, since both real war and fiction come under the dual heading of 
reality and unreality —as when the same vague deictic “all that” refers first to all 
the pain or horror of the war (“when this you see […] with all that”), and then to all 
types of crime stories (“to read mystery stories and spy stories and all that”). Nor 
can we help sensing some irony —but it is perhaps dramatic irony— when she 
sounds surprised at the discovery that death strikes more quickly in the real war 
than in fiction: “[…] you keep on thinking how quickly anybody can get killed, just 
as quickly just as very quickly, more quickly even than in a book even much more 
quickly than in any book […]” (22). 
However, sporadically in the first part of the book, and then gradually more and 
more as we enter its long second part, moments of implication get to be more 
numerous than those of disengagement. Stein will eventually admit being troubled 
by the confusion, and acknowledge the dark difference of this war, with its 
“troubled waters” —the war that finally killed the nineteenth century she says. In 
the course of the book, of the war too that is, we witness a return of (moral) 
implication, and still more of affect. Some rather poignant emergence of emotion 
even manifests itself under the form of a cheap lyricism, the “dear me,” “oh dear,” 
“oh dear me” punctuating her text at signs of fear —fear for the others mainly. 
There even comes a time when the pressure of events gets to have an effect on the 
form of the text, with more precise diary-like dated entries (though limited to year 
and month usually, on the pattern of “Today August 1943” 58); or with accounts of 
radio broadcasts that let the journalistic mode permeate the structure of her text. 
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In such instances, she seems to have been admitting the primacy of external time 
as never anywhere in her work. The text also comes to operate along human 
relations in an unprecedented way, when it becomes a narrative of physical and 
mental survival through relationships, of day-to-day food exchanges and 
conversations with a community of neighbors. At the same time, her current 
frustration regarding conversation and exchange of letters, in particular with her 
American friends and audience, leads her to give an epistolary twist to her diary-
like text. It then often adopts a still more conversational rhythm than usual, and a 
more direct form of address to the reader or audience. Again, that goes against the 
grain for Stein, who certainly practiced a sophisticated form of orality, but 
generally discards the epistolary genre as being too loudly dependent on identity.  
Yet still, even in that second movement of the memoir, under the most intense 
pressure of the event, we can find frequent reminders of the power of literature, 
most notably with the sudden flourishes of Steinian high style. One striking 
example is the moment when Stein has had a dream of Nathalie Barney asking a 
florist to take away her plants from her apartment to water them during the 
summer, and then getting them back in the winter: “[…] and now would she have 
them back again, would she, would the florist would there be a florist, would there 
be an apartment, would there be she” (127). We recognise the halting rhythm and 
sophisticated fake stammering of repetition and hesitation that characterise her 
literary experiments,3   used here to create an effect of haunting absence and 
uncertain return. 4  Stein renounces neither her idiosyncratic strategies of 
digression, nor her systems of interruption, nor either the persistence of a plurality 
of genres, and of literary analogies —as seen earlier. Just before the Liberation of 
France, for instance, she compares the French Résistance to the situation in 
Fenimore Cooper’s The Spy: “[…] but that of course is the extraordinary thing 
about this war it is so historical not recent history but fairly ancient history, not I 
suppose where the armies are actually fighting but here where we are” (204). Not 
only does she reintroduce here the distance of commentary, but she also extends 
the scope of historical relativism, when she recognises some dark ages analogy in 
the confused situation of occupied France, thus ironically replacing historical 
contingency by the generality of history. 
Towards the end of the book, that is of the war too, more and more space 
naturally comes to be devoted to the usual form of reconsidering and revisiting 
commentary. But the ending also brings a major twist, as Stein and Toklas discover 
how dramatically the GIs’ conversation has improved from one war to the other. 
The expected parallel between the two World Wars surprisingly leads to differential 
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conclusions regarding the evolution of the conversational capacity of young 
American boys. In that remarkable ending (as is always the case with Stein), the 
Epilogue effectuates an a posteriori radical detachment of the literary work from 
the sequence of events it has been dangerously close to all along. Instead of a 
narrative coinciding with the end of the war, the finale develops a meditation on 
the evolution of the American language as observed from one war to the other, and 
then historically at large. War as event comes to be instrumental to language, the 
contingency of history being used to the benefit of the history of language. We thus 
move from the historical Liberation of France to the liberation of the American 
language from the English model, that is from the question of political domination 
to that of the mastery of language —as can be seen in the concluding lines: “[… ] by 
shoving the language around until at last now the job is done, we use the same 
words as the English do but the words say an entirely different thing” (258). The 
book ends on the celebration of language making, through the discursive scope of 
conversation with the GIs, and also with the project of a poem Stein had wanted to 
write after WWI on the names of the American states, all so different and so 
similar.5 Even in a moment of historical urgency, and in a work that adopts at times 
the immediacy of a diaristic temporality, Stein adamantly resists the event as 
narrative form. Thus Wars I Have Seen proves to be a singular work which helps us 
realise the process through which Stein resists historical contingency.  
In fact, it seems she converts contingency from one acceptation to another, from 
inevitability of event to possibility of otherness. In the Steinian vision, such 
conversion can also be translated in terms of a passage from the nineteenth to the 
twentieth century. We might view it, then, as a shift from a metaphysical vision to a 
speculative perspective. Stein converts the (imposed) contingency of the event into 
a (chosen) creative possibility, passing from a view of contingency as dependence 
to a view of contingency as potential; from the befalling of the event to envisioning 
it as the possibility that anything could be different from itself or from what it 
seems to be —in Quentin Meillassoux’s terms: “knowing that worldly things could 
be otherwise” 6  (39). Such a proposition might actually prove to be the very 
principle of Stein’s writing stance. She does indeed portray objects, places or people 
as if they were something else, somewhere else or somebody else—hence the 
systematically unrecognisable elements in her portraits, as so many infinitely 
possible forms. Stein also treats the items and features of the real world as being 
perfectly contingent, and their identity as being entirely optional. That might for 
instance partly account for the profuse repetition of a non-ascribable pronoun 
“they” in Stanzas in Meditation (1932), suggesting infinite possibilities for the 
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others’ identity. A similar form of contingency seems to be one of the issues at stake 
in the playful exchange of voices in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas —what if 
not-me could be me, what if “not-my-voice” could be my voice. 
If her writing stance consists in considering and representing the other 
possibility or possibilities in or of anything, we can then understand better why 
openings and closures of books matter so much to her and are such accomplished 
and inventive moments in her works. She indeed dramatises openings and closures 
of texts as moments of tension between the two versions of contingency: 
  
It is another one of the curious difficulties a master-piece has that it is to begin and 
end, because actually a master-piece does not do that it does not begin and end if it 
did it would be of necessity and in relation and that is just what a master-piece is not. 
[…]  And yet after all like the subject of human nature master-pieces have to use 
beginning and ending to become existing. […] in some way one does have to stop. I 
stop.” (“What are Master-pieces” 358-359) 
 
The untimeliness and the internal continuity that characterise a master-piece 
belong to Stein’s category of the human mind and collide with the necessity of time 
limits for the material text, as these limits pertain to “human nature.” Her 
extraordinary “I stop” dramatises the arbitrary suspension of possibility for the 
sake of a return to a contingent temporality that is obviously necessary to the 
retrospective actualisation of the masterpiece. Thus contingency holds the literary 
work in its double-bind: constraint and possibility as well as (historical) time and 
untimeliness both destroying and defining each other. 
The crime story, as extreme form and even literary laboratory for Stein, proves 
enlightening once again. It represented for her the free wheel of speculation as we 
saw earlier, but, more precisely, it offered its infinite structure of any number of 
possibilities to the speculative narrative. Stein completed Wars I Have Seen in 
1944. That same year, she wrote a five-page more or less farcical melodrama 
entitled “Three Sisters who are not Sisters,” in which she stages three sisters who 
are not sisters and two brothers who are brothers, and all five decide to play a 
murder game killing each other (“let us play a play and let it be a murder” 707). 
They all end up dead in the game and all alive on the stage (“It is very nice, very 
nice indeed not to be dead” 711) —or do they? Here Stein is playing out all the 
possible instances of crime (A kills B, or C kills A, etc.), as well as the possibility of 
the crime being either real, or a second inside play, or then a mere game. The play 
exhausts all the combinations of crime, including its fakeness. However fascinated 
she was by the genre, Stein only wrote one crime story, Blood on the Dining-Room 
Floor, subtitled “A Murder Mystery” (1933). It was judged by herself and others as 
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a failed attempt at writing a detective story, but one can alternately view it as a 
crucial experience: having placed herself in a somehow pure structure of 
possibility, she could not resist experimenting with it far beyond the investigation 
system itself. She thus extended possibility to other crimes than the case being 
considered (“And how many possible crimes […]” Blood 25), or to the complete 
suppression of crime (“Could any place be shut away in time. To prevent crime” 
18). She also indulged in speculating on non-existent characters: “There is no Mary 
M. in this case, but if there were this is what she would do” (26). Thus extending 
the crime story principle of open alternatives, she brought it into play on the 
fictional edge, in order to dramatise the author’s power over the story and to 
present herself as master of possibilities. Bordering on a surrealist or fantastic 
treatment, such focus on extreme narrative control evokes Humpty Dumpty’s 
categorical conclusion regarding the author’s semantic authority in Lewis Carroll’s 
Through the Looking-Glass: “‘The question is,’ said Alice, whether you can make 
words mean so many different things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, 
‘which is to be master —that’s all’”7 (196). 
 
Such imperiously free play of possibility characterises one of her most 
remarkable books, Four in America (1933). The work might as well be subtitled 
“Contingent Biographies,” as it revisits the genre of the biography of great men 
through a structure of radical contingency, embracing the systematic possibility of 
otherness for each of the four great American men considered here —a pattern Ulla 
Dydo and Edward Burns sum up as “alternative vocations for great minds” (XIX). 
Here are the opening lines in the form of a prologue: 
 
If Ulysses S. Grant had been a religious leader who was to become a saint what would 
he have done. 
If the Wright brothers had been artists that is painters what would they have done. 
If Henry James had been a general what would he have had to do. 
If General Washington had been a writer that is a novelist what would he do.  (1) 
 
So Ulysses Grant passes from General of the Union army in the Civil War to 
religious leader, and the Wright brothers from pioneers of early flying machines to 
painters, while Henry James is turned into a general and George Washington into a 
novelist.8 All powerful again, the writer here literally “dwell[s] in possibility.”9 Stein 
invents a form of alternative biography, based on historical relativism. She 
playfully disrupts personal history (interchanging vocations) and identity (playing 
on names). She is obviously less interested, as always, in structures of chance than 
in systems of possibilities, which are the province of literary creation. This is 
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evinced by the shift from “what would he have done” (speculation in the past) to 
“what would he have had to do” (playing on a surreal necessity), and finally to 
“what would he do” (supposition in the present, return to fiction speculation). Stein 
is experimenting in how to define or portray any historical figure through the 
narrative of his alternative lives, that is through fiction—as is well exemplified in 
this instance: 
 
Who was Grant. 
Grant what he would be doing what would he be doing if instead of a general he had 
been a leader in religion. 
What would he be doing if instead of being a leader in religion he had been a general. 
(43) 
 
By a masterly Steinman twist, Grant’s actual life comes to be presented as an 
alternative to his fantasised other life. Fiction contributes to biography in Four in 
America, which could be reformulated as ‘Four Possible Figures in America’, or 
‘Four Fates and Their Others’, or still, crossing its title with another one, ‘The 
Geographical History of Infinite Biographical Possibility in America.’  
For Stein, literature can revisit historical facts, fictionalise them, displace or 
replace them, to the point of over-determination. Such systems of possibility might 
even be the most idiosyncratic form of Steinian imagination. They also amount to a 
general mode of thinking, which enabled her to work out the most difficult and 
essential issues in her writer’s life. One of them was her own dual identity as an 
avant-garde or popular author, which she eventually solved through any number of 
shifting roles or parts as dramatised in so many different works.10 Another central 
issue was the brother-sister dispute over the question of her own genius, as it was 
denied by Leo.11  Twenty-five years after the rift between them, Stein was still 
narrating it again in Everybody’s Autobiography, and musing over the possibility 
that Leo and not herself might have been the genius in the family: “It is funny this 
thing of being a genius, there is no reason for it there is no reason that it should be 
you and should not have been him, no reason at all that it should have been you, no 
no reason at all” (79). Again, this is less a meditation on chance than a pondering 
over the potential otherness of everything and everybody—what if she had been 
“not-her,” what if she had been Leo and he had been her—, along the line of a 
rather Shakespearian form of causality without a cause. 12   Contingency as 
possibility proves a central practice in Stein’s thinking (and imagination which, for 
her, is not to be separated from thought), and it determines several of her narrative 
structures. There remains to be seen whether contingency can fully operate as a 
medium.13  
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Not only did Stein practice possibility as a formal structure, but she also worked 
out or invented a sort of grammar of contingency. This is part of what she brought 
to bear, as we saw, against the assault of historical events in Wars I Have Seen. 
Stein’s grammar of contingency includes major stylistic choices and discursive 
features. Let us just briefly mention, for instance, her idiosyncratic practice of a 
general present, where Benjamin’s instant of the past becomes in her writing a 
moment of the present in which all similar instants of all times are compacted, with 
an added effect of generalised possibility. Another main feature would be her 
constant use of markers of indetermination, her any- words, pure contingency 
markers, as best exemplified in this extreme instance: “What is the difference 
between anything and anything” (Geographical 78). More generally, we know from 
her essay “Poetry and Grammar” that she systematically prefers categories of words 
that are rich with possibility, poor words basically, mere tools, or words that open 
the broadest range of interpretation or error—error as possibility or accident of 
otherness. Robin Mackay in an analysis of Straub and Huillet’s film From the 
Clouds to Resistance emphasises the link between poverty and contingency in a 
“[…] methodology where one employs closure and an ascesis of the most austere 
practice in order precisely to allow contingency to break into the work”14 (65). 
While ascesis fails to characterise the structure of Stein’s discourse in so far as she 
luxuriates in repetition and variation, it often applies to her lexical choices. In 
“Poetry and Grammar” she writes: “I like prepositions the best of all,” they “have a 
greater possibility of being something” (Lectures 212). As to error, it is presented as 
the very motive behind some of her word choices: “Verbs and adverbs are more 
interesting […]. It is wonderful the number of mistakes a verb can make and that is 
equally true of its adverb” (Lectures 211). On a still wider range, her practice of 
immediate repetition, or of multiple alternatives of sound and sense can also be 
read as equating or producing figures of possibility. And so does her inventing 
other possibilities for each literary genre: what if autobiography were written by 
somebody else (Alice), what if biography were a fiction (Four), what if fiction were 
autobiography (Alice) 15  and what if poetry and prose were indistinguishable 
(Narration). We definitely find in Stein’s grammar the actualisation of many a 
poet’s dream to invent a language and a form that might be as close as possible to 
possibility. She also elaborated its theatrical and rhythmic transcription through 
her dramatising of hesitation, the insistent stammer that evokes the search for 
alternative words or ideas, or a testing of possibilities—as for instance in “Oh dear 
does she does he does he does she know what the human mind is and if he does and 
if she does and if she does and if he does what is the human mind” (Geographical 
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59). Here the rhythm speaks the pleasurable drama of contingent identity and 
thought. 
So it seems that in Stein literature can embrace contingency in order to create 
effects of something that could just as well be something else, or not be at all. And 
that applies equally to words and genres, actions or characters, and sometimes 
ideas. In fact, the whole enterprise of writing hints at the possibility of its being 
different from the one we know and practice. Likewise, the logic at work and the 
whole system of thinking give the reader the impression of a non-ascribable 
otherness. We then realise that Stein does indeed unsettle the whole Greek system 
of dialectics and paradigms as well as the Biblical pattern of questions and answers. 
Let us read her wondering in The Geographical History of America: “Has the 
human mind anything to do with question and answer. Perhaps no I do not think 
so.” (78); or again, her warning: “Be careful of analysis and analogy” (Geographical 
93). In Stein, we sometimes feel we are entering a system where everything, 
including the modality of thinking itself, could be something else. Reading François 
Julian’s Entrer dans une pensée (Entering a mode of thinking) —a remarkable 
introduction into the Chinese modalities of thinking—, one feels that his central 
idea somehow applies to the impression one has when reading Stein: that of a 
modality slightly other, the point being not to seize nor define it, but just to 
experience the potential difference of “the thought before or the thought beside,” 
just to encounter “that strategic elsewhere that will lead us to break adrift from 
moorings we cannot even contemplate.”16  
Such feeling of a possible otherness, that, as suggested, was the second type of 
contingency (the first being historical constraint), would thus extend the idea of a 
grammar of contingency to a discursive modality and to the very process of 
thinking. In Wars I Have Seen, contingency is at the same time the object of the 
narration and the topic for the ongoing commentary (both pertaining to 
contingency as historical constraint), but also a discursive grammar (as potential 
otherness, source of digression, generalisation). Contingency then comes closer to 
being the very practice and form of writing. Four in America, as we saw, proves a 
case in point, as it is entirely based on a system of biographical otherness. The 
language of literature is always characterised by its foreign or strange quality, in 
other words by its otherness; but foregrounding the contingent nature of the 
literary work or of the work of art rather pertains to contemporary practices, where 
contingency may become the medium itself. To investigate the vision of a twentieth 
century Stein (following Marjorie Perloff’s hypothesis),17  we may confront it with 
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Mackay’s questioning in The Medium of Contingency, as to what could define such 
contingent work:  
 
[…] how to exhibit, within the work, its own contingent nature? How can the work 
deal with the fact that the artist operates within a practice founded not on necessity 
and autonomy, but on contingent conditions—not only those of the material support, 
but also historical, discursive, economic conditions, and the various contentions over 
the nature of the ‘work of art’ itself? (5)  
 
We have seen how Stein does emphasise and sometimes dramatise the “contingent 
conditions” of her work, in language, in discourse, by using life material too, also 
through the form of hesitation, repetition or digression. But the difference from 
contemporary art —which is Mackay’s object of enquiry— might be that while 
converting historical contingency into a discourse and thinking of possibilities, she 
still salvages a form of paradoxical autonomy and power, that of the thinking voice, 





                                                        
1  Stein seems to always refer to a basic whodunit type of crime story, essentially the clear-cut 
classical structure of a crime first, followed by an investigation to find out who the murderer was. 
 
2 This is not the place to really develop that vexed contextual and biographical point, but it 
needs to be said, however, that Stein, as we know, could unfortunately be talked by her 
friend Bernard Faÿ into translating some of Pétain’s speeches, and that it also took her a 
long time before she wrote clear statements about taking sides in the war. The only clear 
thing perhaps is how genuinely she was confused, and could only reflect on the 
contradictions and complications in her conversations with French people then. At that time 
in the war, she was obviously not aware of the ambiguity of her aesthetic delight at such 
complications, nor would she be, later on, when she expressed equal anguish as the 
“collabos” in Culoz were sent miniature coffins or as the Résistants, whom she called “the 
mountain-boys,” were in deadly danger (Wars I Have Seen, see for instance p. 47, 147, 226). 
There is no knowing whether she was completely unaware of what was going on behind the 
scenes, nor whether or not she felt in danger as a Jew. But the end of Wars I Have Seen 
reveals how wholly American she had remained, as it dramatises her coming into her own at 
the arrival of the GIs, her compatriots. Now if we accept the limit of an author’s meditation 
on war, it appears that the Second World War baffled Stein’s original vision of war —as 
expressed in Four in America in 1933 for instance, where she asserts that everything is 
already over when a war begins: “The real fighting has all always been done before the war 
commences but as everybody likes explanations everybody likes everything proved 
everybody likes a war so there has to be the war” (26). World War II proved a contradiction 
in point, everything happening there and then, and most confusedly. 
 
3 As in “If I Told Him,” 1923: “Would he like it would Napoleon would Napoleon would he 
like it.” Portraits and Prayers 21. 
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4 One might hear in this passage a vague reminiscence of the second part of Virginia Woolf’s 
To the Lighthouse (1927) “Time Passes,” and of Mrs. McNab’s ghastly presence in the 
deserted house, mostly during World War I. 
 
5 Stein had already written several texts about the American States, such as “Wherein Iowa 
Differs from Kansas or Indiana” in Useful Knowledge (1928), or “American States and How 
They Differ From Each Other” (1935) in How Writing is Written (1974); in which she played 
on difference and repetition (also that of the sounds in the names of the States), even though 
those texts were not the poem she wanted to write but never did. In the short time that was 
left her before her death in 1946, she did take up an idea from the finale of Wars I Have 
Seen, but it was that of conversation, which turned out to be the project for her next text: in 
1945 she wrote Brewsie and Willie, a prose text in 19 chapters, dedicated to the GIs and 
composed of their conversations, in which the very contingency of event turned out to be a 
frequent topic. 
 
6 In the original French phrase, “[…] savoir du pouvoir-être-autre de la chose mondaine” 
(Meillassoux 66), the pouvoir-être-autre conveys more powerfully the contingent condition 
of otherness (it could be translated more literally as “the potential otherness”). 
 
7 Also quoted by Robin Mackay in his “Introduction” to The Medium of Contingency, in 
relation to “complicity with contingency” (9). 
 
8 If Four in America is among other things a displaced composite self-portrait, what needs to 
be noted is that Stein sees herself or projects herself primarily as a writer and as a general, 
then also as painter, aviator, religious leader and saint. 
 
9  Emily Dickinson, “I dwell in Possibility –/ A fairer House than Prose –” (Poem 657, 
Johnson, vol.2: 506). 
 
10 After her traumatic reaction to the popular success of The Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas, Stein took to meditating on the potential otherness of her own self and dramatising 
her reflections; this line remained dominant in her works from 1933 to 1937, to reach its 
most elaborate form in Everybody’s Autobiography, where she finally liberated herself from 
the constraint, or contingency of the audience’s reaction. 
 
11 Stein obviously never accepted Leo’s dismissive judgment on her work, over which they 
eventually broke off in 1913, never to reconcile. (Brenda Wineapple devoted a whole book to 
the subject, Sisterbrother, Gertrude and Leo Stein. 
 
12 The projected exchange of fates between sister and brother evokes the “otherness system” 
of Four in America, but with the major difference that in Four Stein operated a shift 
between geniuses, or at least major American figures, while here the point is to know which 
of the two siblings was to become “One in America.” 
 
13  The title of this essay was inspired by a collective of essays on an exhibition of 
contemporary art entitled The Medium of Contingency, 2008 (comprising artists like Liz 
Deschines, Sam Lewitt, Hans Bellmer, Thomas Unggerer, all creating works that deal with 
and through possibility, precariousness, ambivalence or disappearance). The authors of the 
collection acknowledge their debt to the line of the speculative renewal of thinking 
contingency, in particular Quentin Meillassoux’s important essay Après la finitude, Essai 
sur la nécessité de la contingence, 2006; After Finitude, 2008—mentioned supra. 
 
14 Mackay, in the “Discussion” part of The Medium of Contingency. 
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15 I am thinking here of the last lines of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, where Stein 
declares she is going to write the autobiography herself, and to “write it as simply as Defoe 
did the autobiography of Robinson Crusoe” (913). 
 
16 My translation. “Pensée d’avant ou d’à côté”; “cet ailleurs stratégique qui nous fera rompre 
des amarres que nous n’envisageons pas” (Jullien 27, 12). 
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